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JUVENILE CURFEw: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES AND BEYOND
Jeremy Toth*
INTRODUCTION
The ever increasing problem of crime in America dominates
today's political platforms. Politicians are scrambling to show voters
that they are aware of, and concerned with, this growing crisis. But
the real crime is not just crime per se, it is a violent rage against basic
societal values of decency. And more often than not, we are stunned
by the age of the perpetrators.
Three teens barged into a classroom in April of 1993 and beat
and stabbed a 16-year-old to death while a honified class looked on.1
A 14-year-old student shot another student in the back as school was
dismissed in Charlotte, North Carolina.2 Two students sprayed a
school ground with fire from automatic weapons in Washington,
D.C.3 And this violence is certainly not confined to the school
grounds. Five children in Dallas, raped a woman and then shot her
* The author is a 1996 I.DJM.A. candidate at the University at Buffalo. This paper
is dedicated to Eugene Fahey for continuing outstanding public service in the
Western New York area. The author wishes to thank the office of Eugene Fahey for
their research assistance; and Susan Branagan for her support and gentle criticism.
I Richard W. Riley, Curbing Youth Violence, 122 USA TODAY 36, Jan. 1994.
2 Thomas Toch, Violence in Our Schools, US NEWS &WORLD REP., Nov. 8, 1993,
atl.
31d.
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repeatedly, leaving her paralyzed.4 And 1 1-year-old Robert Sandifer
(a.k.a. Yummy), in September of 1994, was executed by the gang he
was attempting to join
Since the mid-1980's the murder arrest rate of young people
has doubled.' The rate of homicides committed by 18 to 24-year-olds
increased 62% from 1986 to 1991,7 and the rates for adolescents ages
14 to 17 increased by 124% in the same time period.8 US News &
World Reports printed the results of a survey showing that 5% of
twelfth graders had been injured by a weapon during the 1991-92
school year, 14% had been threatened with a weapon and at least 13%
had been injured without a weapon A recent survey asked public
school teachers what they considered to be the most serious
disciplinary problems. The results of this survey, disturbing in and of
4 Lourdes Rosado, Keeping Teens Off the Street: More Cities Try Curfews,
NEWswEEK, July 15, 1991, at 21.
1 Nancy R. Gibbs, Murder in Miniature, TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 55. The story of
Robert Sandifer is probably the most disturbing recent event in the area ofjuvenile
crime. Gibbs' article is an excellent portrayal of the event and I strongly
recommend it to everyone at all interested in the plight of American youth. The
story of "Yummy" begins "On a bright September afternoon last week, the mothers
of Chicago's south side brought their children to a vigil for a dead boy they had
never met. They wanted their kids to see the scrawny corpse in the loose tan suit
lying in a coffin, next to his stuffed animals, finally harmless.... [No one] it seems,
was ... surprised. The neighborhood was still grieving its other dead child, the girl
Yummy allegedly killed two weeks ago, when he was supposed to fire on some rival
gang members but shot 14-year-old Shavon Dean instead. Police descended on the
gang and Yummy became a liability." It at 55-56.
6Ted Gest & Dorian Friedman, The New Crime Wave, US NEvs & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 29, 1994, at 26.
' James Alan Fox & Glen Pierce, American Killers Are Getting Younger, USA
TODAY Jan. 1994, at 24.
8d.
9 Id (reprinting a survey conducted by Michigan St. University and Tulane
University).
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themselves, become almost humorous when compared to the results
of a similar survey conducted in 1940.10
1940 I990
Talking out of turn Drug abuse
Chewing gum Alcohol abuse
Making noise Pregnancy
Running in the hall Suicide
Cutting in line Rape
The problem is real and growing." What can be done to stem the tide
of adolescent violence and juvenile delinquency?
10 Id. Former Chief Justice Burger has been quoted as saying "The serious
challenge of restoring a safe school environment has begun to reshape the law.
Days in school with dedicated teachers and eager students struggling to master their
lessons have given way, all too often, to disorder and gripping fear of violence by
teachers and students alike." Kevin S. Washburn, Crime in the Schools, L. DAILY
L, April 14, 1992, at 6.
n1 Criminal statistics aggregated by age are virtually non-existent. See Keeping
Teens Off Streets: More Cities Try Curfews, NmvswEEK, July 15, 1991, at 12. See
also FALCON BAKER, SAVING OUR KIDS FROM DELINQUENCY, DRUGS, AD DESPAIR
3 (1991) (stating that "crime statistics are at best only educated guesses, and all too
often are tainted by political expediency, sloppy record keeping, and outright
deception."). My research, however, did reveal a smattering of statistics in the area.
The number of felons from ages 13 to 15 has increased 50% in New York State in
the past year. Daniel Wise, Prosecutors Endorse Legislative Program to Fight
Juvenile Crime, N.Y.LJ. Mar. 27,1992, at 1. Of all the 174,000 crimes committed
in the California school system, 70,000 were violent. Dan Lungren, Some Schools
are WarZones, L.A. DAILY J., April 14, 1992, at 6. In 1983, nearly 21,000 violent
crimes were committed by juveniles under the age of 15. JAMES A. FARMER, HIGH-
RISKTEENAGERS 4 (1990). A survey in 1992 found that one in five students carry
a weapon into New York schools. Robert D. Mcfadden, Report Finds 20% of
Students in New York City Carry Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at B3. In 1990,
2,000 children under the age of twelve were arrested, and every month 5,000
teachers and 300,000 students are assaulted by other students. BAKER, supra note
11, at 6-8. For an excellent discussion of the problem throughout American society
see Jerry Adler, Kids Growing Up Scared, NEWSWEEK Jan. 10, 1994, at 42.
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Attempts are being made by private groups and governments,
both local and national, to address this question. In many areas of the
country, legislatures and other government agencies and officials are
considering more stringent penalties for juvenile offenders. 12 In
addition, schools are instituting new regulations in order to curb the
threat of violence.1 3 Private efforts to help attack the problem include
1 Vincent Shiraldi, Dumb on Crime: Trying 14-year olds as Adults is Costly,
Ineffective, L.A. DAILY J. April 8, 1993, at 6 (reporting that the Californian
Attorney General is proposing a lowering of the age at which ajuvenile can be tried
for murder); Bill Bryan, Attack Crime with a Vengeance, Board Suggests, ST.
Louis DIsPATCH, Nov. 26 1993 at b 1, (reporting that the Board of Police
Commissioners recommends more prison space and more prison time for juvenile
offenders); Elaine S. Povich, Senate OKs Teen Crime Amendment, Cm. TRm., Nov.
6, 1993, at 1 3 (reporting that the United State's Senate overwhelmingly approved
a bill to treat 13 year olds as adults if they commit a serious crime with a gun);
Gerard F. Russell, Worcester Officials Urge Steps to Combat Violence, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sep 18, 1993, at 19:5 (reporting that city officials of Worcester,
Massachusetts are advocating prosecuting juveniles as adults); Wise, supra note 11
("We need to change an antiquated law that was designed for kids of 30 years ago,"
said Queens District Attorney Richard A. Brown. "Today it's a wholly different
world where kids are committing acts that were unheard of a few years ago."). For
an examination of the changes occurring in the juvenile justice system see Martin
L. Frost & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing
Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME 1. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323
(1991). Frost and Blomquist argue that the two major changes that have occurred
within the system are that the "serious juvenile offender" has been removed from
the juvenile court and that sanctions have become more punitive. Id. The general
attitude of the country has become more punitive and legislators are capitalizing on
this mood employing what has been called the 3 R's" of criminal law: retribution,
retaliation and revenge. Fox, supra note 7.
3 GaiI Diane Cox, Back-to-School Clothing Guide, NAT'LL. ., Sept. 6 1993, at 6
(reporting that the Southern California's San Jacinto Unified School District has
instituted a dress code in order to diminish the threat of gang conflict); Dan
Lungren, Some Schools are War Zones, LA. DAILY 1., April 14, 1992, at 6
(advocating the use of metal detectors in schools for screening all incoming
students, as well as drug-free and gun-free zones around schools); John E. Jacob,
With Cheap Guns Flooding the Streets, There will Be No Refuge in Classrooms,
LA. DAILY I., April 14, 1992, at 6.
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midnight basketball leagues,' 4 programs geared towards violence
prevention that help students deal with problems of self esteem,15 and
programs that expose juveniles to adult offenders in an attempt to
steer youths away from crime.16
This paper will discuss one of the many government attempts
to curb juvenile crime: the nocturnal juvenile curfew. 7 Part I will
briefly explain the purpose of curfews, as well as their construction
and implementation. Some of the more general arguments levied
against curfews will also be addressed. Part II will discuss the
constitutionality of a juvenile nocturnal curfew. It will present an
analysis ofjuvenile rights including a discussion of Bellotti v. Baird
as it relates to juvenile curfews. This section will present the
argument that although the Supreme Court has not addressed the
curfew issue nor specifically laid out the rights of juveniles, there has
been consistency among the lower courts when assessing the
constitutionality of curfews. The discussion will then focus on the
specific constitutional issues which arise in a juvenile curfew
14 Michael Murphy, A Midnight Oasis, Hous. CHRON., May 2, 1993, at B 21.
15 Aileen Streng, Alternate Program Gives Hope to Suspended Students, DEmorr
NEws, May 20, 1993, at 6N.
16 Larry Bivins, Detour From Danger, DETROrr NEWS & FRm PRESS, Aug 1, 1993,
atB1.
7 This discussion works on a number of assumptions. First, though I advocate a
juvenile curfew, I in no way mean to suggest that a curfew is the only method
available. No one program can completely eliminate the problem ofjuvenile crime.
A nocturnal juvenile curfew will work only in conjunction with other reform
measures. Such other measures include educational reform, gun control, drug
rehabilitation and prevention, welfare reform and juvenile justice reform. Juvenile
crime can only be attacked through a comprehensive approach. This paper
discusses one tool in that approach.
A second assumption I make is that a curfew will be written properly. This
includes a reasonable curfew time and punishment, as well as numerous exceptions
to the curfew including going to and from work, direct parental supervision,
remaining on one's own property, attending a church or community event, etc. See
Appendix A for an example of a properly constructed curfew.
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challenge. Part III will be an examination of the major sociological
work done with respect to juvenile delinquency. It is my belief that
those theorists who argue against the efficacy of a curfew do so
without having considered any of the research done in the area. I
will show that curfews arguably fit into their general analysis.
PART I. A GENERAL WORD ABOUT CURFEWS
Generally speaking, a curfew is a law that restricts the times
when a juvenile can be away from home and unsupervised.18 A
curfew has three goals: (1) to protect children from nighttime
violence; (2) to prevent reckless and mischievous youth from
engaging in delinquent activity at night, thereby reducing crime; and
(3) to assist parental supervision.19 The first and second goals listed
are, perhaps, intuitive. Juveniles will be unable to commit street
crimes at night if they are not on the street. Likewise, children are far
less likely to be victims of street crime if they are not on the streets.
It is the third goal that needs more explanation.
Although it may be argued that curfews infringe upon the
rights of parents to allow their children the freedom to do what they
want, it must also be recognized that this parental right is not beyond
regulation. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown the federal district
court stated that
" See Appendix A for an example of a working curfew.
19 People In the Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989). The court
actually explained a curfew in terms of four separate purposes, but I have
condensed the purposes into only three. See also Waters v. Barry, 711 F.Supp.
1125 (D.D.C. 1989) (listing the same three purposes for a curfew). Other courts
have also discussed the general purpose of a curfew in these terms but have not
listed them in the same succinct manner as did the court in J M. or in Waters. See
e.g., Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg 550 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990);
People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. 1977); City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220
N.E.2d. 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966).
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When actions concerning the child have a relation to
the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
state may act to promote these legitimate
interests .... Mhus, in cases in which harm to the
physical or mental health of the child or to the public
safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these
legitimate state interests may override the parents'
qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children.20
Therefore, the rights of parents may be limited to a certain extent2 in
order to protect children as well as the community. Furthermore, it
must be acknowledged that a curfew will, in fact, assist parents in
supervising their children and force those parents who are otherwise
neglectffl to provide adequate supervision. "By providing a sanction
against the parent [and child] who knowingly permits a child to
violate the statute, the cooperation of the parent is commanded. ' 22 In
other words, parents who can not keep their children at home at night
will be assisted and those parents who do not wish to keep their
children home at night will be forced to do so.
A properly constructed curfew will limit the hours of
prohibition from about 11:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m?3 These hours may
be diminished on the weekend. The punishment for a curfew
violation can be as light as simply returning the child to his or her
401 F.Supp. 1242, 1262-64 (M.D. Pa. 1975)(emphasis added).
2S See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d. 488 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that the only parental
right that a curfew infringes upon is the right of the parent to allow their child to
wander away from home at night without supervision or a legitimate purpose).
' Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 16-17 (fll. App. Ct. 1990)
(citing People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55 (11l. 1977)).
' In Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d. 815 (2d Cir. 1976), the court was
forced to invalidate a curfew because it had no cut off time. It began at 11:00 p.m.
and never ended. Id. at 818. See Appendix A for an example of a properly
constructed curfew.
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home, or as heavy as imposing a fine on the juvenile.24 The most
severe punishment should only be a minimal fine paid by the parents.
Most importantly, a curfew should provide ample exceptions to
enforcement. These exceptions include emergencies, accompaniment
by a guardian or parent, returning to and from work, and attending an
officially organized community event such as school or church
activities. A curfew that does not have these exceptions is far too
severe and may not be upheld by the courts.5
Several arguments have been levied against curfews. Many
of these arguments come from legal scholars and courts and will be
discussed later in the discussion. Other arguments, however, come
from concerned citizens. The first such argument, and the most often
voiced, comes from those who believe curfews are racially
discriminatory. 6 Those opposed to curfews for this reason claim that
the enforcement of curfews, and the entire spirit of such regulation,
tends to be aimed at only inner city areas and not the "safer" white
neighborhoods. This argument is weak, at best,2 7 for those most often
calling for new curfews, or enforcement of existing ones, tend to be
black leaders.28 In fact, one black leader has argued that those
opposed to curfews are the most discriminating. He claims that white
leaders are hesitant to institute a curfew because black kids are those
I In City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989), the court upheld a
curfew chiefly because the only sanction was to return the juveniles to their homes.
Ia at 364.
' See e.g., Johnson v. City Of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981); City of
Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Wash. 1973).
1 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 160 (1972) (arguing that
a curfew aimed at adult vagrants contained racial undertones).
-' At least one author has attacked this discrimination argument as weak. John
Hood, Curfew Craze, 22 REASON 46-47 (APRm, 1991)[hereinafter Craze]; JOHN
HOOD, The Trouble with Curfews: They Oppress the Good Kids But Don't Hinder
Crime, LA. DAmYL, May 28, 1991, at 6 [hereinafter Trouble].
28 See Craze, supra note 27, at 46; Trouble, supra note 27, at 6; Sabin Russell Black
Clergy Urges Curfew for Youths, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 1993, A 22:3.
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most affected and victimized by crime? Even more to the point was
Buffalo Councilman Archie Amos' comment in defending his stand
for a curfew: "I found it interesting that the NAACP took a position
to make it a black-white issue. In fact, crime is being committed by
teen-agers both black and white. It's a youth thing not an issue of
color."30
Related to this argument is the concern that police officers are
given too much discretion when determining whether to enforce the
curfew.31 Community residents fear, and perhaps rightly so, that even
the most equitably written curfew may result in inequitable
enforcement by police officers. They fear that only minority juveniles
will be arrested. While this argument may seem reasonable, evidence
suggests that curfews can be, and are, equitably enforced.
For example, in the first six months of Buffalo's curfew, the
arrest statistics showed no signs of unfair treatment by the police
toward any particular ethnic or social group. As manyjuveniles were
arrested in the more affluent areas as were arrested in the poorest
neighborhoods.3 2 A comprehensive review of the Phoenix curfew
also reveals that enforcement did not fall across racial or geographic
lines. In nineteen weeks of enforcement, 39% of those arrested were
Anglo-American, 9% were African-American, and 51% were
Hispanic.3 3 While the numbers for the Hispanic community are
higher, they are certainly not egregiously higher when considering the
" See Craze, supra note 27, at 47. Robert Ford, a black Charlestown City
Councilman said 'Tin not going to wait for the white kid to get beat up."
" Anthony Cardinale, Curfew Proposal Draws Fire in Council, BuiF. NEvs, Feb.
13, 1991, atB5.
31 Id.
32 Jane Kwiatkowski, Worst Fears, Highest Hopes Unrealized as Cities Youth
Curfew Comes ofAge, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 11, 1994, at D1.
33 Dennis A. Garret - Police Chief, Comprehensive Review of the Citywide Juvenile
Curfew Program - a report to Sheryl L Sculley Assistant City Manager, OrrY
CouNciL REPORT, Sep. 30, 1993.
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population make-up ofPhoenix.34 Furthermore, in that same nineteen
week period, the number of arrests was evenly distributed across the
city. There were 790 arrests in West Phoenix, 391 arrests in North
Phoenix, 588 in South Phoenix and 423 in East Phoenix.3 5 These
numbers simply do not confirm, and, in fact, undermine, the argument
that police enforcement of a curfew will necessarily be racially
motivated.
Police officer discretion can be viewed positively as well.36
Discretion will allow police officers to incarcerate groups of youth
meandering through the streets at midnight while ignoring the child
running to the store. The curfew is meant to be a tool to assist police
officers, not a means to incarcerate every child on the street after
dark.37 It is discretion that keeps the curfew from becoming the
draconian measure feared by so many people.
The American Civil Liberties Union further claims that
curfews interfere with the rights of parents.38 Parents around
America, however, are generally supportive of juvenile curfews.39
1 Twenty percent of the people living in Phoenix are of Hispanic origins. BUREAU
OFTmCENSus, CENsus OFTHEPOPuLATON ARIZONA 1990 Table 6 at 19.
35 Garret, supra note 33.
3 Eldrin Bell - Police Chief, THE CrrY OF ATLANTA JUVENIL EXPERIENCE June 2,
1991 (stating "[o]ften just a 'hello and why aren't you at home' by an officer is
enough to direct a child off ofa street comer and to their home.") Thus, the police
officers can use their own discretion in determining when to arrest a youth.
3 Deputy Chief Taylor of Atlanta stated 'We're not interested in locldng up a lot
of parents or ldds. [The curfew] is a tool we can use to tell these young dds to go
home." Gene Warner, Curfew Called Useful as Tool, Not as Panacea, BuFF.
NEws, Feb. 17, 1991, atBi.
3 The ACLU opposes a curfew for this reason. See Rosado, supra note 4.
9 Id. See also Shelley Emling, Curfew Idea Gathers Steam in DeKalb, ATLANTA
CONsTMON July 23, 1993, G 6:2; Alma E.Hill Atlanta Curfew Keeping Youth
off Streets, ATLANTA I. CONST., Feb. 16, 1991, at B 1:5. See also Garret, supra
note 33.
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Parents seem more concerned with effective enforcement of the
curfew than they are with protecting their perceived sphere of
control.4 Furthermore, curfews seem to be supported by a majority
of the public. For example, a Phoenix poll showed that 93% of the
people surveyed supported the curfew imposed in that city 4'
The arguments just presented in Part I represent the bulk of
attacks against curfews coming from citizens and interest groups.
Part II will focus on the arguments against curfews raised by the legal
community.
PART 11
A. Constitutional Rights of Juveniles and the Nocturnal Juvenile
Curfew
The constitutional rights of juveniles have been firmly
established since the 1960's. In Re Gault42 completely overhauled the
administration of juvenile courts and is often cited as the beginning
of the modem era for juvenile rights.4 3 Since Gault, other rights have
40 See Rosado, supra note 4, at 21; see also, supra notes 19-21 and accompanying
text.
41 93% in Phoenix Poll Support Teen Curfew, THE ARIZONA REPUBIC, Oct 13
1993.
42387 U.S. 1 (1967). The court extended constitutional rights of criminal procedure
to include juveniles. Among these rights were the right to counsel, the right to
notice, and the right to fair treatment standards and due process.
43 See Note, Assessing the Scope ofMinors'Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews
and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1167 n.20, (1984) [hereinafter
Scope]; and Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinance Does Not Violate Constitutional
Rights of Minors, 54 TEX. L. REV. 812, 815 (1976).
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been judicially added to expand the protection for adolescents. 4
Thus, "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone.: 4
5
The Supreme Court, however, has not so extended the rights
of juveniles as to be coextensive with those of adults. In Prince v.
Massachusetts,6 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute
prohibitingjuveniles from selling magazines, newspapers or any other
periodicals on the street. The Court stated that:
the mere fact a state could not wholly prohibit this
form of adult activity, whether characterized locally as
a'sale! or otherwise, does not mean it cannot do so for
children. Such a conclusion granted would mean that
a state could impose no greater limitation upon child
labor than upon adult labor. Or, if an adult were free
to enter dance halls, saloons, and disreputable places
generally, in order to discharge his conceived
religious duty to admonish or dissuade persons from
frequenting such places, so would be a child with
similar convictions and objectives, if not alone then in
the parent's company, against the state's command.
The state's authority over children's activities is
broader than over like actions of adults. This is
peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of
employment. 7
4 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (protecting juveniles from double
jeopardy); In ReWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (applying the "beyond a reasonable
doubt! standard for juvenile criminal offenders); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (protecting the right of
adolescents to wear arm bands as an act of political expression).
45In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
4 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
47Id. at 168
.VoLMXV
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Although this case does predate Gault, Prince has been cited in
several recent cases as the authority on juvenile rights in comparison
to those of adults. The most notable, for this discussion, is Bykofsky
v. Borough ofMiddleton"8 which upheld a nocturnal juvenile curfew.
The Bykofsky court noted that minors are deprived of many
rights afforded to adults (e.g., voting, drinking, enlisting, driving) and
justly so.!9 Although the rights of juveniles are protected, the state
has traditionally been allowed more leeway when the subject of
regulation is adolescents. Therefore, despite the general protection of
juvenile constitutional rights, there remains a significant grey area
that continues to raise controversy and debate. Until the Supreme
Court definitively resolves the issue ofjuvenile rights, and addresses
the curfew specifically, lower courts will be forced to continue
analyzing the issue on a case by case basis, recognizing that children
have rights that are not identical to those of adults.50
Despite the silence of the Supreme Court on the curfew
issue,51 it should be noted that there are some incontrovertible
principles upon which lower courts have agreed. First, age is not a
suspect classification and, therefore, a juvenile curfew does not
violate the equal protection clause as long as it is rationally related to
the desired outcome.52 Only one court has found that a juvenile
48 401 F.Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See also City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S.
19, 27 n.4 (1989); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 692
(1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,231 (1972).
49 401 F.Supp. at 1256-57.
50 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bykofsky. In his dissent of this decision,
Justice Marshall stated that "the question squarely presented by this case, then, is
whether the due process of the rights of juveniles are entitled to lesser protection
than those of adults." 429 U.S. 964, 965 (1976)
51 See Scope, supra note 43, at 1168 n.27.
52 See Bykofsky, 401 F.Supp. at 1265 (citing Gregory v. Aschcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)). For an example of the "rational
basis test" see Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). For an example of the "compelling state interest test" see Ill v. Stone, 421
U.S. 289 (1975). The rational basis test is the lowest level of the three tiers of
1994-1995
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curfew was not in fact rationally related to its desired effects,53 but
even in this case it must be remembered that the court did not treat
age as a suspect classification warranting a higher standard of
analysis.
A second similarity among curfew cases is that the courts
almost universally recognize the limited power of the state to regulate
juveniles. In Johnson v. City of Opelousas,54 the court struck down a
curfew because the statute allowed too few exceptions. The court
acknowledged that valid curfews could exist, however 5 and held that
"[r]estrictions on minors that would be unconstitutionally invalid if
applied to adults may be justified only if the restrictions serve a
significant state interest . . that is not present in the case of an
adult."56
In City of Seattle v. PullmanY7 the Washington Supreme
Court found a curfew to be too vague and thus unconstitutional. Like
the court in Johnson, however, the Washington court stated, "[w]e do
not prohibit the state from imposing reasonable controls on the
conduct of minor children during evening hours."58 Many other
courts that have found a juvenile curfew unconstitutional have done
so for reasons of semantics, not for violations of constitutional
judicial scrutiny. This test merely requires that a piece of legislation be rationally
related to a legitimate outcome. This test is easily passed because virtually any
outcome can be determined legitimate. The highest level of judicial scrutiny
requires that the legislation address a compelling state interest in the least restrictive
way. The third test is somewhere between these two extremes. It is a more recent
creation, used in the area of gender, and is not important for this discussion.
- Waters v. Barry, 711 F.Supp. 1125, 1139 (D.D.C. 1989).
54 658 F.2d. 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
55 Id. at 1072-73.
-6 Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Intern'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
57 514 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1973).
581d. at 1061.
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principles.59 Thus, the objection of many courts is not with the
curfew itself, but with the manner in which it is worded or enforced.
There is a third similarity among more recent curfew cases.
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Bellotti v. Baird.60 This case
seemingly presented a new approach to the issue of juvenile rights
generally, and to curfews specifically. This Bellotti approach has
been at least a part of all decisions concerning juvenile curfews. This
development requires a detailed discussion as I believe that Bellotti
has been misapplied by the courts and that continued reliance on
Bellotti is misplaced.
On August 2, 1974, the Legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed an act requiring mothers under 18 years of age
to obtain consent from both of their parents before undergoing an
abortion.61 In its analysis, the court discussed matters which have
been addressed above. The court first stated, "a child, merely on
account of his maturity, is not beyond the protection of the court,"
62
but then went on to say, "[c]hildren have a very special place in life
which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other
cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to
determination of the State's duty towards children."63 In other words,
the Bellotti court recognized that "although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against government
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal
system to account for children s vulnerability."6
" See Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976); City of Eastlake
v. Ruggiero, 220 NX.2d 126 (Ohio App. 1966); Alves v. Justice Court of Chico
Judicial Dist., 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. App. 1957).
60 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
61 IdL at 625.
62Id. at 633.
63Id at 634 (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528,536 (1953)).
64I- at 635.
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The court then discussed the inability of children to make
mature choices, as in the case of Prince v. Massachusetts.65 Finally,
the Bellotti court discussed the unique and irreplaceable roll of the
parent in the upbringing of the child. Again quoting Prince, the court
stated, "it is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations that state can neither supply or
hinder."66 This led the court to the decision that "[l]egal restrictions
of minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for full growth and maturity that
make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding. u
67
This decision can be synthesized into three rationales allowing
the state to treat children differently than adults: (1) a state may take
appropriate action where a decision will have "potentially serious
consequences" because children are often incapable of making mature
decisions;58 (2) the state may "adjust its legal system" since children
have a special vulnerability; 69 and (3) the important role of parental
responsibility within our society entitles parents to the "support of
laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility. 70 These three
considerations allowed the court to uphold the Massachusetts statute
requiring parental consent. More importantly for this discussion,
however, is courts that have addressed the constitutionality of
juvenile curfews have used these three rationales to create a three
6Id. at 636.
MId. at 638.
6' Id. (citing Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Children to their Rights, B.Y.U. L. REV. 605
(1976)).
"aId at 635.
69 Id.
70Id at 639.
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prong test. Regardless of whether the court has upheld the curfew or
invalidated the curfew, the "Bellotti test" has been employed.
Both Waters v. Barry71 and McCollester v. City of Keene72
struck down juvenile curfews on specific constitutional grounds, as
opposed to the semantic concerns discussed earlier.73 In Waters, the
court stated, "[a]n application of [the Bellotti] criteria in this case
makes clear that there is no basis for treating juveniles differently
than adults; accordingly, the Act must fall."74 In McCollester, the
court was equally plain: "the City fails to meet the three-prong test of
Bellotti."75 Although there were other factors guiding the decisions
of these courts, the application of Bellotti was clearly fundamental in
dictating the outcome. As the Waters court was more explicit in its
application of Bellotti than the McCollester court,7 6 it is that
application I now examine.
The Waters court found violence to be ubiquitous, and that
children were no more prone to it than adults. '7 Moreover, the
Waters court believed the decisions contemplated by the Bellotti court
did not include the decision to venture outside of one's home at
night.78 Finally, the court found that although keeping a child at
home might foster parental guidance in those homes where guidance
1711 F.Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
72 586 F.Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984).
1 See also Scope, supra note 43, for a discussion of curfews generally failing the
"Bellotti test."
74 711 F.Supp. at 1136-37.
"5 586 F.Supp. at 1385.
76 The McCollester court did not fully explain why the curfew failed the "Bellotti
test" other than to briefly discuss the vulnerability of children. Id. at 1385-86.
n 711 P.Supp. at 1137.
78 Id.
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had deteriorated, the curfew ignored those families that maintained
strong support and discipline without state assistance. 9
This analysis is flawed in many ways. The mere fact that
violence is ubiquitous should not invalidate a juvenile curfew,
especially when it is reasonable to assume that children may very well
be more susceptible to victimization. Moreover, this argument
sounds suspiciously close to an equal protection analysis: an analysis
which has already been refuted in the context of age. Furthermore,
while the Waters court argued that children are no more endangered
by violence than adults, it failed to offer any empirical evidence
supporting this claim.80 The vulnerability of a child is not simply
physical; there are emotional and mental vulnerabilities as well."1
This leads to the Bellotti rationale.
Children are in general poor decision makers,82 as Bellotti
acknowledges. In the context ofjuvenile curfews, decisions to cause
791d.
I For a discussion of some empirical evidence see supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
8See infra note 69 and infra Part I.
82Susan K. Knipps, What is a Fair Response to Juvenile Crime?, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 455, 464 (1993). See also LAMAR T. EBMEY & MARK C. STAFFORD,
AIERICANDELINQUENCY43 (3d ed., 1991) (stating that "[t]he modem concept of
childhood suggests that children must be stringently safeguarded, must receive a
carefully structured education, and that only after many years of moral, physical,
and intellectual quarantine can they be allowed to join adults."); JAY S. ALBANESE,
DEALING WITRDELINQuIENCY 41 (1985) (stating that adults are considered to be
more responsible for their behavior then are children); Gisela Konopka, Conditions
for Healthy Development of Adolescent Youth, in ISSUES IN ADOLESCENT
PSYCHOLOGY 63 (Dorothy Rogers ed., 1977) (stating that "youth must develop the
capacity to make decisions in many areas") (emphasis added); BARBARA M.
NEWMAN & PHILIP R. NEWMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ADO.ESCENCE 339-41 (1979) (arguing that the existence of the distinction between
juveniles and adults is predicated upon the assumption that delinquents are not
mature enough to be responsible for their actions); E. A. PEmL, THE NATURE OF
ADOLESCENT JUDGMENT 152 (1971) (stating that age is positively correlated with
the growth of mature judgment and behavior).
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trouble are subject to peer persuasion. Delinquency is often thought
to be caused by peer pressure. 83 The need of juveniles to conform to
peer groups is greater than that of average adults, thus the
vulnerability of juveniles' psyches is far more acute.84  This
vulnerability, coupled with a poor decision making ability, leads one
to believe that a curfew passes the first two criteria of Bellotti, for
childhood is marked by a particular set of circumstances that makes
adolescents both emotionally and physically vulnerable.85 The
Waters court, however, determined that not only are children no less
vulnerable than adults, an unsubstantiated claim, but that the decision
making ability discussed in Bellotti was not meant for this particular
issue. This assertion masks a greater truth.
Bellotti dealt with abortion rights, and thus the language of its
decision was aimed at that specific issue. The Waters court may have
been correct in concluding that Bellotti did not cover the decision to
leave home at night, but Bellotti did not purport to cover anything
except abortion; the Supreme Court did not consider juvenile
curfews, as such was not the issue before it. Still, the Waters court
uses Bellotti as a general guide, but when Bellotti does not
specifically address the issue of curfews, the Waters court denies the
possibility of extending the Bellotti decision beyond its literal
meaning. The Waters court, however, went beyond any possible
literal interpretation by holding that Bellotti was the last, definitive
word on juvenile rights.
8 3 HOWARD KAPLAN, PAT RNS OF JUVENLE DELINQUENCY 145-47 (1984). See
also Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 MIcH. L. REV.
109, notes 116-17 and accompanying text, (1977) [hereinafter Curfew Ordinances].
s Id.; see also Curfew Ordinances, supra note 83, at 131.
85 See Stanley H. King, Coping with Growth in Adolescence, 69 in IssuEs IN
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 68, 69 (Dorothy Rogers ed., 1977) (stating that the
traditional views of adolescence show that it is a time marked by conflict, turmoil
and rebellion); PAMELA RICHARDS ET AL., CRIME AS PLAY, 26-35 (1979) (arguing
that delinquency is a result of experimentation with peers during leisure time);
Konopka, supra note 82, at 63 (arguing that the search for identity during
adolescence is more conscious than it is during adulthood and highly emotional).
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The final rationale set forth in Bellotti is the role parents play
in raising their children. The Waters court conceded that a curfew
would help those families in which guidance had broken down, but
also argued that a curfew might interfere with other parental wishes.
A similar argument was recently refuted in Qutb v. Strauss.86 The
Qutb court upheld a curfew, claiming that the only interference a
curfew created was the limit placed on parents' abilities to allow
children to leave the house at night, during curfew hours,
unaccompanied by an adult.8 7 Is this such an intrusion? The Qutb
court ruled that it was not.
Of course the Waters and McCollester courts' rationales are
not entirely flawed. Bellotti may indeed lead one to believe that
curfews are unconstitutional. The flaw in this reasoning, however,
lies not in the examination of each of the three criteria, but in the
application of Bellotti itself. The Bellotti court was deciding a highly
controversial issue, an issue having nothing to do with juvenile
curfews. There is no reason to believe the court had any other
intention for its decision other than requiring parental consent. And
since Bellotti, the Supreme Court has not applied the criterion in any
other broader way.8g Thus there is no reason to believe the court
96 1 F.3d. 488 (5th Cir. 1993).
8 7d at 495. New York State Dale Volker stated "The concept that youths have a
right to be on the streets late at night is the perspective of a teen age mentality."
Dale M. Volker, Curfew is Necessary to Force Supervision, BUFF. NEWS, April 3,
1993.
" Bellotti has been used most often in two different contexts: the abortion issue,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502
(1990); Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986); Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Asheroft, 462
U.S. 476 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); and the issue of the death
penalty for juveniles Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (overturned
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992)). Bellotti was also cited in
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), where the court ruled that an
ordinance that restricted the admission to a skating rink on the basis of age and hour
of night was constitutional. It is interesting to note that the court did not in any way
use the "three prong test" ofBelloti, especially since Stanglin so closely resembles
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intended Bellotti to be the new doctrine of juvenile rights. If one
insists on placing such significance on Bellotti, and superimposing its
meaning on the issue of juvenile rights generally, then perhaps the
only definitive rule to come away with is, "[1]egal restrictions of
minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for full growth and maturity that
make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding."8 9 The other possibility is that Bellotti merely stands for
the tenet, "teenager[s] [are] less able to evaluate the consequences of
[their] conduct." 90 As rules, these remain vague, but at least it is a
vagueness that the court itself expressed, not the injection of a totally
new principle.
Those courts deciding the issue of curfews in light of the
"Bellotti test" have been misguided. The rationales stated in Bellotti
were not intended to, nor can they be made to, fit this issue. I shall
now address the specific constitutional issues involved in a curfew,
namely the right to move and freedom of speech.
B. Issues of Constitutionality
1. Right to Move
In United States v. Guest,91 the Supreme Court held that the
right to interstate travel is protected by the Constitution. Although
there is no direct evidence that the right to move (the right to control
one's own locomotion) is protected by the Constitution, there is little
reason to believe otherwise. In Bykofsky, then, the court stated, "[n]o
the issue of ajuvenile curfew.
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
1 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979)).
91283 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
1994-1995
IN THE PUBLIC IMREST
right is more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the liberty
assurance of the due process clause than the right of every citizen to
the possession and control of his own person, free from restraint or
interference by the state,"92 and,
[t]he rights of locomotion, freedom of movement, to
go where one pleases, and to use the public streets in
a way that does not interfere with the personal liberty
of others are basic values 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.93
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,94 the court found
general wandering and strolling to be amenities that have "dignified
the right of dissent and have honored the right to be non-conformists
and the right to deny submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of
high spirit rather than hushed, suffocating silence."95 And perhaps the
most notable declaration of the right to move came from Justice
Douglas' concurrence in Aptheker v. Secretary of State96, where he
stated:
Those with the right of free movement use it at times
for mischievous purposes. But that is true of many
liberties we enjoy. We nevertheless place our faith in
them, and against restraint, knowing that the risk of
abusing liberty so as to give rise to punishable
conduct is part of the price we pay for this free society
401 F.Supp. 1242, 1255 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
93 Md at 1254 (quoting U.S. v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920)).
94405 U.S. 156 (1972).
9-aId at 164.
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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.... Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other
rights suffer ....
Thus, it would seem that despite a lack of an explicit declaration by
the court the general right to move is in fact a fundamental right 8 that
can only be abridged if the statute in question is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.99
2. First Amendment Bights
The rights provided by the First Amendment are usually not
debated within the context of juvenile curfews. In the instances
where such issues are raised, however, (e.g., the right to associate, the
right to free speech, right to expression of religion) the curfew being
challenged typically fails to contain the necessary exceptions for the
legitimate exercise of First Amendment privileges.'( The most
compelling argument discrediting First Amendment challenges to
juvenile curfews was put forth by the Ilinois Supreme Court in
People v. Chambers.0' The lower court had ruled to invalidate a
curfew, concluding that it infringed upon the rights of adolescents to
move about in public and to socialize, both of which are rights
97 378 U.S. 500,520 (1964).
9' See Martin E. Mooney, Note, Assessing the Constitutional Validity of Juvenile
Curfew Statutes, 52 NOTRE DAts L. REV. 858, 878-79 (1976-1977) [hereinafter
Assessing Curfews] (arguing that it is difficult to argue that the right to move is not
a fundamental right).
" City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989) (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969)).
" Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1258 (M.D. Pa. 1975);
Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., 306 P.2d 601, 605 (Cal. App. 1957).
101360 N.E.2d 55 (111. 1977).
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protected by the First Amendment.'2 In response to this argument,
the Illinois Supreme Court in Chambers overruled the lower court
and stated, "[tihe statute is not aimed at any of the fundamental values
of speech, association or expression protected by the first amendment,
and indeed the suggestion that those values are impaired by the
restriction here involved seems to trivialize them."1°3 The court went
on to say that the right of children to choose with whom to associate,
and when and where they associate, was not an unlimited, absolute
right.1' 4 Certainly one might argue that a juvenile curfew infringes
upon First Amendment rights, and, indeed, that was done in Waters
v. Barry.105 However, the court has also stated "[ijt is possible to find
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes - for example, walking down the street or meeting one's
friends at a shopping mall - but such a kernel is not sufficient to
bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment. 10 6
A curfew infringes only on a small "kernel" of the liberties protected
by the constitution.
A properly constructed curfew contains exceptions for
registered First Amendment activities as well as instances where the
adolescent is accompanied by an adult. In other words, a child is
losing only ancillary rights at night when not accompanied by an
adult.
102 335 N.E.2d 612 11. App. 1975).
103 335 N.E.2d 55,57 (1977).
104 id
105711 F.Supp. 1125, 1128 (D.D.C. 1989).
6 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 US. 19, 25 (1989).
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3. Standard of Review
What then is the proper standard of review for determining the
constitutionality of juvenile curfews? Despite the fact that courts
have traditionally been more lenient in reviewing regulations of
minors,107 I maintain that, because the fundamental right to move is
infringed upon, strict scrutiny is appropriate.' Strict scrutiny
requires that a statute be narrowly drawn to satisfy a compelling state
interest10 9
In Qutb v. Strauss,"0 the court analyzed a juvenile curfew
under the strict scrutiny test after assuming that a curfew did, in fact,
violate fundamental rights."' The court first determined that the
interest of the state in protecting the welfare of children was
compelling. The court then ruled that the curfew was narrowly drawn
to meet the compelling interest. For a statute to be narrowly drawn,
there must a nexus between the stated government interest and the
107In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,75 (1976)
the court stated that the appropriate standard of review when dealing with juvenile
rights is a "significant state interest" test This standard of review, however, has not
been used to any great extent, being employed mainly in the context of the abortion
issue. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 120 L.Ed. 2d 674, 754 n.8 (1992);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); ILL. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,404 (1981); Carey v. Population Sers.
Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977). It was also stated in Johnson v. City of Opelausas,
658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981). Because this new standard has only been used
sporadically it is difficult to argue that it should be used for determining the
constitutionality of ajuvenile curfew.
'OS ee also Mooney, Assessing Curfews, supra note 98, 1976-77. Mooney argues
that strict scrutiny is appropriate but does not then present an analysis of its
application. Id at 879.
1' Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
110 11 F.3d. 488 (5th Cir. 1993).
111Id. at 492 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1982)).
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classification of those affected by the statue.'12 A "tight fitting" of the
statute ensures that the statute was not constructed for illegitimate
ends.113 The court concluded that since the state presented a
multitude of empirical evidence describing the problems of crime,
including the fact that most violent crimes occur at night,114 the
curfew was the least restrictive means available for furthering the
state interest. The court also .placed great significance on the fact that
there were a variety of exceptions that protected legitimate activities
of juveniles.1i5 Such exceptions even further tightened the statute.
Finally, the court stated that the intrusion on parental rights was
minimal." 6 The Qutb court ruled that a properly drawn curfew could
pass the highest of constitutional standards."
7
There is yet another possible standard of review that might be
employed. In Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate,"' the Maryland Court
of Appeals ruled that a compelling state interest was addressed when
112 Icd at 493 (citing City of Richmond v. LA. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989)).
13Id
.
114 I&
11ItL
116 Id. at 495.
I But c. Waters v. Barry, 711 F.Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989). The Waters court
employed the strict scrutiny test as well but ruled that a juvenile curfew is not
constitutional. The court found that the statute was "a bull in a china shop of
constitutional values," Id. at 1134. The court also stated that it must act "gingerly"
when stifling personal liberties. The court went on to conclude that a curfew would
not work. They ruled that it will not deter criminals and that daytime can be just as
dangerous as night. Id. at 1135. It is interesting to note that the court did not rely
on any evidence for these claims other than one statistic that showed the murder rate
was higher during the day. This hardly stands as a thorough investigation of all the
pertinent issues. The court also employed the Bellotti test. Id.; see supra part II,
section B.
11 204 A.2d. 688 (Md. 1964).
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a summer resort town instituted a juvenile curfew during Labor Day
weekend. The curfew had been enacted in response to the large
influx of adolescents during this weekend. In its decision, the
Thistlewood court asked three questions: (1) is there an evil to be
addressed; (2) do the means employed to combat the evil have a real
and substantial relation to the evil sought to be corrected; and (3) do
the means employed "unduly infringe or oppress fundamental rights"
of those persons affected? 19 Although the court did not explicitly
use the strict scrutiny test, (Thistlewood predates Shapiro), the three
questions asked are simply a rephrasing of the strict scrutiny test
employed in later fundamental rights cases. This "reasonableness
test" could also be used to determine the constitutionality of a
juvenile curfew.
My discourse has already answered the first question
presented in Thistlewood; there is a growing evil in American
society. 120 The third question has also been answered; the rights of
juveniles are not completely coextensive with those of adults, but the
liberty they lose as a result of a curfew is very small. The second
question, however, remains to be answered. Restated, the question
is whether ajuvenile curfew will work? Can a curfew curb crime by
and against adolescents?
In Waters v. Barry,12' the court concluded that because most
murders occur during the daytime, and because criminals will not be
deterred by such a simple regulation, the curfew would not work.
This simple-minded analysis ignores the fact that murders are not the
only evil to be prevented. This analysis also ignores the sociological
119 Id- at 693. This test came to be known as a "reasonableness test" and was used
in several subsequent cases. See e.g., In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972)
(ruling that curfews are in general reasonable); City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220
N.E.2d. 126 (Ohio App. 1966) (a curfew is a justifiable police action but cannot
exceed the bounds of reasonableness); Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial
Dist., 605 P.2d 601, 605 (Cal. App. 1957) (where a curfew that had no written
exceptions was found to be unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional).
" See supra Introduction.
121711 F.Supp. 1125, 1139 (1989).
1994-1995
IN TBE PUBLIC ItWREVLST
work done on delinquent behavior. It is this second point to which I
now turn.
Even in cases where the court has concluded that curfews will
work, there has been little or no reliance on relevant authority; there
have been only guesses. Analysis by courts and legal authors have
relied solely upon legal arguments to either support or denounce
curfews.12 An examination of some of the major theories relating to
'1 One of the better examples of this myopic analysis can be found in Scope, supra
note 43, at 180, where the author states that the "unique developmental
characteristics of childhood fail to justify the limits that curfews place on the
exercise of the fundamental rights of movement and association" without offering
more than scant evidence to support such a claim. This author also claimed that
"[because their capacities of reason and emotion are not yet fully formed, children
are more likely, in certain situations, to make decisions or take actions that may
cause serious damage to the children themselves or to others or may even alter the
course of their entire lives." ME at 1168. The presence of such unsubstantiated
claims within this piece of scholarship is especially noteworthy because this article
is often cited to by the courts as an authority. Another example is People in the
Interest of I.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989), in which the court states:
We believe that a child's liberty interest in being on the streets
after 10:00 o'clock at night is not co-extensive with that of an
adult. The three factors enumerated in Bellotti are all present in
this case. Youths abroad at night are more vulnerable to crime
and peer pressure than their adult counterparts. Similarly, a
child's immaturity may lead to a decision to commit delinquent
acts, such as vandalism, drug or alcohol use, or crimes of
violence. Although adults may also make these decisions, they
are more likely to do so in an informed and mature manner with
full consideration of the consequences of their acts. Courts have
recognized that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them. Id at 223.
This assertion may in fact be accurate, but the court offers no evidence for such a
claim. Even in Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d. 488 (5th Cir. 1993), the court discusses the
incapacity of children to make sound judgments without supporting this claim. See
also Assessing Curfews, supra note 98, at 879 (where the author argues that a
curfew would probably not reduce crime and yet presents with very little research).
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juvenile delinquency will indicate that a curfew may go a long way
in curbing juvenile delinquency. In fact, if ajuvenile curfew will not
work to at least some degree, then there is little reason to consider
the constitutionality of a curfew.
Part III of this discussion includes an examination of the
major theories of juvenile delinquency. Such an examination will
support the claim that a juvenile curfew can, at least theoretically,
work. Discussing the efficacy of a juvenile curfew without any
examination of sociological work reduces the analysis to
unsubstantiated conclusions. This is something I seek to avoid.
PART m
A. Multiple Marginality
There are a variety of sociological theories on juvenile
delinquency. These theories do not necessarily conflict, they simply
focus on different aspects of the problem. Although it is quite natural
within the realm of social sciences to find oneself espousing one
particular theory over another, James Diego Vigil presents what he
and others call the "multiple marginality theory. '123 To his credit, this
theory addresses the problem ofjuvenile delinquency in the same way
Geertz approached social phenomena: through a "thick description."
Simply defined this is a recognition of the complexities of inner city
life. It is a "multi-dimensional analysis" which weaves together all
related theories into a broad examination of the gang sub-culture.
Thus, "the multiple marginality construct offers an integrative
interpretation, a way to build theory rather than a theory itself."' 24
There is no one single theory which deals effectively with all
causes of gang development; it is merely a question of emphasis.
' JAmm DIEGo VIGI, BARRIO GANGS: STREET LnS AND IDENTITY IN SOUTHERN
CALiFORNIA, 9-12 (1988). I should mention here that some analyses may focus
simply on gang formation rather than juvenile delinquency as a whole.
124 Id. at 173.
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Each theory is not exclusive of any other, and each theory contributes
to a fuller understanding of the problem.
Passing these [gang] theories through the prism of
multiple marginality best reflects the complexity of
modem urban society. Multiple marginality implies
more than just many gang facets. It also entails the
many situations and conditions that contribute to
gangs .... Similarly, while other gang theories may
utilize particular variables to underscore their point, it
is the collective synthesis of these variables that
determines early involvement and subsequent regular
gang membership. 125
With this theoretical frame of mind it becomes impossible not
to examine all of the major theories ofjuvenile delinquency. To truly
advocate a juvenile curfew, all of the existing major theories
addressing juvenile delinquency must be presented. Legal success
depends specifically upon whether a curfew will work. Arguing for
a curfew based upon expected positive results requires one to be
cognizant of the work done in the area, and knowledgeable as to what
the experts have learned. To disregard one particular theory would
be to risk leaving out an important piece. Therefore, the next section
is a general outline of the theories concerned with juvenile
delinquency. It should be noted that I am not presenting these
theories in any particular order.
B. The Sociological Perspective and Some Practical Applications
Shoemaker claims that there are three basic sociological
conceptions ofjuvenile delinquency, each based upon a focus of the
12S Id. at 172-73.
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lower class.1 26 The first of these is a strain theory initially espoused
by Cohen, which places the causation of delinquency upon basic
differences between the cultural values of the middle class and the
lower class. 12
7
In Cohen's theory, the middle class values of success,
responsibility, self-control, long range planning, respectfulness, and
politeness, are the values which dominate the school system.128 The
lower class values of aggression, realism, skepticism and immediacy
are therefore in direct contention with the school structure. A child
from the lower class will do poorly in school because he is at odds
with the value system.329 This conflict will create a feeling of low self
esteem and of rejection. 130 To improve self esteem the child
associates with others in the same situation, and together their
hostility and aggression towards the middle class value system
ferments. 131 Finally, the juvenile is prodded into delinquent acts to
gain esteem within the peer group.132 Thus, the rejection of school
values leads to an association with a deviant crowd in order to
improve self esteem.
Cohen's theory is labeled a strain theory in light of the strain
between expected middle class values and enforced lower class
'26 DONALD J. SHOEMAKER, THEORIES OF DELINQUENCY: AN EXAMINATION OF
EXPLANATIONS OF DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR 116 (2d ed. 1990). I have relied
primarily upon Shoemaker's book for my research. This means that I have adopted
Shoemaker's taxonomy. For other reviews of this literature see M RCHAELRurOR
& HENRI GILLER, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: TRENDS AND PERSPECIVES, (1983)
[hereinafter RUTrER]; EMPEY, supra note 82.
127 SHOEMAKER, supra note 126, at 117.
128ME at I18.
129m
130 Id at 119.
131 l at 118-19.
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values.133 Empirical research has corroborated some strain theories,
as a definite link exists between delinquency and poor school
performance.1 34 It may also be assumed that ours is a stratified
society, and that value systems will conflict. It cannot be shown,
however, that these conflicts cause delinquency, nor can it be proven
that the lower class drop-outs harbor aggression towards the middle
class value system.' 35 Cohen's theory does have its merits in that it
points to the critical link in juvenile delinquency, namely the failure
within the school system to deal effectively with students of the lower
class,136 but he fails to explain why most delinquent acts occur
outside of school. 137
Another strain theory comes from the work of Cloward and
Ohlin, who reason that expectations of success stem from a concept
defined by the middle class which is then superimposed upon the
lower class. 38 While children in a lower class environment have the
same economic aspirations as those within a middle class
environment, their paths to this success are blocked.1 39 They compete
with the middle class and invariably lose. This results in frustration
and low self-esteem which, in turn, leads to delinquency. This
hypothesis is a departure from Cohen in that Cloward and Ohlin
emphasize goals and aspirations, while Cohen specifically states that
it is the lower class value system which is at odds with the middle
class. Cloward and Ohlin claim that everyone aspires to achieve the
American dream, but unfortunately, the opportunities to fulfill that
'
33 Id. at 116-24.
Id. at 120.
'
35 Id. at 120-24.
13 ld. at 124.
37 See RuTrER, supra note 126, at 246.
138 SHOEMAKER, supra note 126, at 125-26.
"
9Id. at 126.
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dream are not evenly distributed. 14° It is these blocked opportunities
that produce strain.
Cloward and Ohlin's theory also focuses on the specific
manifestations of frustration in relation to the attitudes of the
neighborhood. Factors such as the presence of adult criminal activity,
the perceived importance of the neighborhood school, and the
stability of the community all serve to define the characteristics of the
delinquent. 141 In this aspect, the theory is useful for defining specific
delinquent behavior. Cloward and Ohlin also detail three possible
outcomes for the delinquent in terms of subculture: criminal sub-
culture, conflict sub-culture, and retreatist sub-culture.1 42 Those
adolescents living in the criminal sub-culture achieve success through
crime, while those in the conflict sub-culture can find no way to
succeed, often resorting to seemingly mindless violence. The
retreatist sub-culture is left for those who turn towards drugs to
alleviate their spirit.143 This particular strain theory has not survived
empirical tests.144 In general the theory seems to gloss over
complicated psychological processes and, therefore, has difficulty
accounting for differences among juvenile delinquents. 145 There is
support, however, that neighborhood characteristics and organizations
define juvenile delinquents.' 4
Walter Miller is the author of a highly politicized theory of
lower class delinquency. He postulates that a definite lower class
male value system exists similar to that described by Cohen (i.e.
140 See EMPEY, supra note 82, at 232.
"I IL at 231-34.
.
2 d at 233.
143 Id.
144Id. at 240-245.
146 id.
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toughness, street-smartness, excitement, autonomy, fatalism). 47 He
goes on to state that, because female oriented households dominate
the underclass, the young males of such households turn to gangs in
order to enforce and further develop these values.148 Delinquency
represents the only source for male role models, and so it becomes the
focus of attention for the adolescent. 49 Thus, this theory suggests
that delinquency is an intrinsic aspect of the lower class. It also
implies that a "culture of poverty" does exist.150 The primary
weakness of this theory, however, lies in the fact that no real research
was conducted. The theory is "substantiated more by common sense
and haphazard observations than by systemic research."' 51 Miller
espouses the "culture of poverty" theory without truly testing it
empirically. 5 2
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay first proposed their theory
in 1942. Resting upon the concept of social disorganization, Shaw
and McKay's theory assumes that a breakdown of community
institutions, resulting from rapid industrialization and urbanization,
or increased immigration to a specific area, will lead to
delinquency. 5 3 This process starts with an increase in population
coupled with the overall decline of living conditions caused by
industrialization.'5 4 These events encourage urban flight, leaving the
147 Id. at 190.
148 Id at 189-90.
149 d 
'
50 !d at 138.
,5, DONALD 3. SHOEMAKER, THEORIES OF DELINQUENCY 125 (1984).
152 See SHOEMAKER, supra note 126, at 135-41.
'
5
' Id- at 84-89.
4 See EMPEY, supra note 82, 180.
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uneducated and less economically secure behind.155 Community
institutions break down as a resulL "Under such conditions, parents
are relatively helpless to control or help their children ... demoralized
slum parents are unable either to provide direction for their children
or control their delinquent tendencies."'156 An individual within a
disorganized community responds to this situation in a natural and
instinctive way, by locating the only organization within the
community - the gang.
Relating delinquency to geographical areas is justified because
of increased delinquency within the most densely populated sections
of cities and those sections experiencing the greatest amounts of
industrialization. Some statistical evidence may support these
claims. 157 Weaknesses do exist, however, for the theory does not
account for cultural values, nor does it consider why there are
individuals within these areas who are not delinquents and why
delinquents exist outside of these areas. 158
Related to this theory is the anomie theory 59 which instead of
placing the burden upon community institutions, leaves it with the
community as a whole.16° The disorganized community, so goes the
argument, will result in delinquency. Thus the anomie theory relies
upon the same geographical considerations as Shaw's and McKay's
theory of social disorganization, and, as such, fails in the same
,1- Id. at 183.
Idj
,7For example, 8 in 10 delinquents acts are committed in groups. Empey, supra
note 82, at 183; see also Ru'rErR, supra note 126, at 249.
158 See SHOEMAKEI, supra note 126, at 90-7.
159R UTrER, supra note 126, at 245. This is taken from Durkheim's similar notion
of anomie.
16 SHOEMAKER, supra note 126, at 98.
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ways. 161 Both of these theories also lack a micro-sociological
standpoint, and fail to show exactly how disorganization affects the
individual.162
Another school of thought has been labeled the control theory.
A basic assumption of this theory is that delinquency is a universal
tendency which is only kept in check by internal and external
forces.163 Reckless' containment theory, a personal control theory of
delinquency, points to the individual's personalized feelings and self-
concept. 64 All individuals have pushes and pulls which are
internalized and handled, depending upon the individual. For
example, a person lacking a role model and having a low self esteem,
perhaps derived from a sense of alienation from school or from their
community, may be easily swayed by a peer group.165 Here, in
Reckless' terms, the strength of the external push would be stronger
than that of the internal pul.1.'
Hirchi's control theory is somewhat different than Reckless'
as it focuses less on an individual's self concept and more on the
individual's relationship with religion, family, and school (the
community as a whole). 67 Four basic concepts accompany this
theory: commitment, attachment, involvement and beliefs.168
Commitment refers to the adolescent's internalization of values and
beliefs. It is considered a type of informal cost-benefit analysis where
161 Id at 108.
162 id.
163 Id. at 173.
164 Ia at 175.
16s Id at 177-78.
166Id.
6 Id. at 182-84.
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the child assesses the benefits of conformity to accepted societal
values in comparison to the costs of nonconformity and delinquency.
Attachment considers the psychological and emotional connection to
other groups, and the importance of these other groups' opinions.
Involvement refers to the level of participation in conventional
activities. "[A]dolescents who are busy doing conventional things -
duties around the home, studying, or engaging in sports - may not
have time to be delinquent."' 69 Beliefs involves the acceptance of
traditional values as legitimate. 70 As the belief of legitimacy wanes,
the likelihood of delinquency increases. 171 The most important
finding of this research is that, "school experiences are not only
directly associated with delinquency, but that they are also relatively
more associated with delinquency than other institutional variables,
namely family relationships.i 172
Sutherland's theory of "differential association," first proposed
in 1938, has recently been reexamined. 173 This theory stresses
learning, and suggests that criminal behavior is learned.' 74 This
learning is facilitated through association with criminals. 175 The
differential association refers to the frequency and strength of
association with these criminal elements. The greater the association,
the greater the chance of delinquent behavior.176 Sutherland argues
that the underlying cause of criminal activity is cultural conflict, but
169 EMPEY supra note 82, at 261.
17 0 SHOEMAKER, supra note 126, at 183.
171 id.
172 DONALD I. SHOEMAKER, TBEORIES OF DELINQUENCY 173 (1984).
173 See RuTrrR, supra note 126, at 265.
174 SHOEMAKER, supra note 126, at 151-52.
175Id at 152.
76 Id. at 153.
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this idea is not pursued to a great extent. The reason for the
reemergence of differential association is the corroboration by
modem empirical analysis of some of its tenets, notably, that most
delinquent acts occur in the presence of other delinquents, and the
probability ofjuveniles committing specific criminal acts has been
found to be statistically dependent on the commission of similar acts
done by their peer group.
17
Where then does a curfew fit? Arguably, nowhere. Indeed,
the sociologists discussed above have never addressed the issue.
They speak of societal reform, education reform, juvenile justice
system reform, but never anything so mundane as a juvenile curfew.
This may lead one to argue that even the sociologists of the study
would not favor a curfew. This argument, however, is not a logical
inference. Sociologists do not advocate a curfew because they are
concerned with the prevention of delinquency on a societal level. A
curfew is not designed or intended to rid America of juvenile
delinquency, it is merely intended to curb its manifestation. Those
who favor curfews in no way believe that the very serious problems
of American adolescence will be solved by curfew alone,178 for a
juvenile curfew is no panacea for delinquency or crime.179 It is one
tool among many that is available. Indeed, it is not even the most
powerful tool. A review of the sociological perspective shows that
education reform would go much further in reducing juvenile
delinquency, but that does not render curfews ineffective.
Curfew can be effective, and that is illustrated by the theories
presented above. Each theory contains at least one common thread
-
77 Id at 149-50.
178 See Rosado, supra note 4, at 21. Buffalo Common Councilman Archie Amos
stated "This bill will not correct the structural problems in a family. It will not
create an environment in the home that will promote communication and it will not
make a parent or guardian become involved with his or her child. It will, however,
remove these youth from some of the negative influences on the streets."
Councilman Amos Defends Curfew Ordinance, THE CHALLENGER, Nov. 11, 1991.
179 ide
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that should not be underestimate; the ability to perform delinquent
acts relies on the availability of both time and group strength. This
may seem to be so trivial as to be unacademic, but it is important. In
a strain theory context, for example, the child needs the support of
other adolescents to encourage delinquency in an effort to improve
self esteem. In Hirchi's social control theory, those children
committed to legitimate activities simply do not have time for
delinquency. In terms of the external pushes and pulls presented by
Reekless, a child needs to be externally pulled by delinquency. This
obviously occurs through an association with those who can provide
the pull. If criminal behavior is learned, as Sutherland postulates,
then it must be taught. Even if a community has deteriorated to such
a degree that there exists no organization, an adolescent still needs to
find that organization among his peers through association.
These major theories provide evidence that adolescents unable
to associate with deviant peers for extended periods of time will not
exhibit delinquent behavior. Is this not just what a curfew
accomplishes? By making it difficult for the group of delinquent
juveniles to convene at night, and to wander the streets, a curfew
necessarily reduces the external pull of delinquents. 'Whether or not
a youth who is motivated to perform delinquent acts in fact performs
such acts depends on the youth's experience of counteracting motives
and opportunities to perform the acts."180 This same author goes on
to say:
Even in the absence of counteracting motives, the
youth cannot perform the delinquent act he is
motivated to perform without opportunities to do so.
... The opportunities for delinquent behavior are
increased by circumstances influencing the existence
of stable delinquent subcultures in the environment
and favorable interaction with those who share the
subculture. Such opportunities are decreased by
effective negative sanctions for delinquent behavior
ISo KAPLAN, supra note 83, at 147 (emphasis added).
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that diminish the availability of delinquent role
models as well as the means and occasions for
delinquent activities.'
81
Thus, the strongest argument for a curfew lies neither in the legal nor
in the academic world, but in a simple matter of opportunity. As I
have stated, a curfew may not decrease the motivation to perform the
delinquent act, but it will undoubtedly curtail the availability of the
deviant social group that influences and coerces the activity of each
member.
This very practical argument is further buttressed by work
done with gang members. Many gang members claim their gangs
began as an informal group of friends that later named themselves
collectively.
You know we were just standing on the comer, then
we just got to just getting together every day, and then
we came up with something called the 34th Street
Players. And as we kept going north, the gangs got to
coming around and they got to have gang fights and
they got to robbing and just carrying on.182
Me and my friends were just sitting around and my
friend said let's get some names to put on our shirt
that no one has. Then, so I said, "I know, the
"Sheiks." im fixing to look it up in the dictionary and
see what it means, and it said, "a strong person." So
I said, "That fits me." So we got the "Sheiks" put on
the back of our shirts, and then they said, "Who is the
Sheiks?" And I said, "It's going to be a dancing
group.'
83
'Id. at 149.
18 Jo N HAGEDORN & PERRY MACON, PEOPLE AND FoLKs, 61 (1988).
11I3L at 59.
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It is clear that simple association leads to organized delinquent
behavior. The fact that adolescents have the time to associate in such
groups facilitates the process of delinquency. A curfew will
necessarily constrain these factors. Unsupervised association will no
longer occur during the night, thus, reducing the opportunity to
commit illegal acts.
One further argument in favor of curfews is the showing
through gang member testimonial that time spent at home decreased
as delinquent activity increased. The importance of the single parent
household (invariably the mother), should not be underestimated
within the context of the inner city. Gang members often mark a
father's departure from the family, either through divorce,
imprisonment, or disappearance, as a pivotal point in their lives.
Then things got different when my Dad passed away.
I went to a party and got all wasted on pills, sniffing,
smoking weed, and drinking. I almost passed out of an
overdose.... My mother could not take care of the
house, her children [five of them], and her work at the
same time. I began to feel lonely and started a
complex that my mother didn't love me because she
didn't take care of me the way she used to. I felt like
a stranger in my own house as I got older because I
was not able to communicate with anyone .... 184
This statement from a gang member illustrates that a juvenile in a
single parent home is at an extreme disadvantage. The pressure of a
street socialization and the lure of the adolescent peer group often
overwhelm the parental influence, especially when there are many
children in one household. The peer group becomes a stronger
reference group than the family.
A curfew will not magically reinvigorate the American family,
but it will help to reinforce bonds to the family. Children will be
184 VIGIL, supra note 123, at 44-45.
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forced to stay at home. I do not mean to trivialize the problems of the
American city by suggesting that a curfew will solve the crisis,
because as I have stated, no single policy can accomplish this task.
A curfew is just one helpful tool available to policy makers. Some
may call curfews Bandaids which obscure the real problems. Indeed,
curfews are Bandaids, but Bandaids can be effective if utilized
appropriately and temporarily until more effective and substantive
policies can be implemented.18 5
CONCLUSION
This discussion presented legal arguments, sociological
arguments and practical arguments for the institution of juvenile
curfews in American cities. There is one approach that remains
untouched, the philosophical argument, Does ajuvenile curfew mesh
with the overarching American ideals about government?
Americans have traditionally disliked and distrusted big
government and government intervention.18 6  Can a curfew be
reconciled with these feelings? Unfortunately, no amount of
philosophical posturing can persuade instinctive, gut level, responses.
To the social libertarian in all Americans,"'8 the notion of a juvenile
18 Despite the lack of good statistical evidence, at least some cities who have
instituted a curfew are reporting success. Alma E. Hill, Atlanta Curfew Keeping
Youths Offthe Street, ATLANTA J. CoNsT., Feb. 16, 1991, at B 1:5; Ruth Rendon,
Stringent Juvenile Curfew Paying OfforPasadena, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 28,1993,
at C 3:3; Laura Laughlin, New Curfew Wins Praise in Phoenix, L.A. THMs, Sept.
9, 1993, atA5:1.
'6 PAULM. SINDERMAN, A QUESTION OF LOYALTY (1981).
" By social libertarian I in no way mean to infer that Americans generally support
the Libertarian political party. I simply mean to suggest that Americans generally
fear "Big Brother" activity on the part of the government. But see THEODORE J.
Lowi, THE END OFLIBERAUSM (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that since the 1960's and the
advent of "interest group liberalism" the existence of big government has been
viewed by American society as not only legitimate but as a necessity).
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curfew speaks of draconian measures in a totalitarian regime."s Iask
the reader to suspend these instinctive responses and to realize that
juvenile crime is reaching epidemic proportions. Despite the lack of
solid statistical evidence it is clear that youth crime is now a
commonality. One author, who argued against curfews, said,
"[a]bsent evidence that juvenile crime has reached an emergency
level, children, like adults, are entitled to the presumption that they
will behave in accordance with the law. '189 I submit to the reader that
the level of juvenile crime has already reached an emergency status.
So while one grapples with notions of the "good society" and the
proper role of government, the crisis grows.
Cities will continue to consider curfews a viable measure
because they have been shown to have positive effects. In San
Antonio, juvenile victimization decreased from 3,600 cases to just
over 800.190 In Little Rock there has been a 14% decline in overall
crime.19' Furthermore, comprehensive studies of curfews enacted in
18 This perception of a curfew as a product of totalitarianism is completely
exaggerated. Curfews have not been used to arrest children by the thousands. For
example, Lieutenant David Zimprich of the Milwaulkee Police stated "If kids are
at a church dance that breaks up at 11, we're not going to stand outside and write
tickets." Gene Warner, Curfew Called Useful as Tool, Not Panacea, Bur .NEWs,
Feb. 17,1991, atBi. In Atlanta, the police have formally stated "Our first initiative
in protecting our children was the education of children and parents to the risks or
[sic] wandering the streets late at night. Our approach was to educate our children
and their parents, rather than to emphasize arrests." Eldrin Bell Chief of Police for
Atlanta Update on the Atlanta Police Curfew Policy, July 17, 1991. At the time
this report was made 82% of the juveniles encountered after hours were released to
the custody of the parent with no other enforcement action. Id. Similarly in Buffalo
in the first six months of enforcement none of the juveniles encountered were forced
to pay the fines ranging from $25.00 to $200.00. Kwiatkowski, supra note 32.
119 See Scope, supra note 43, at 1177.
110 Nancy Wantzman, The Curfew Revival Gains Momentum, GOVERNiNG, Feb.
1994, at 20.
191 Id. One police officer in Little Rock stated "We're not going to say that the
curfew is a cure all. It's just one of the many programs that may have helped." Id.
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both Phoenix and Atlanta show success.'2 Those courts and persons
worried about the rights to a "late-night game of basketball, to sit in
the open air on a muggy summer night, or to walk home at one's
leisure from an unregistered church" 193 or "stargazing, sitting on the
sidewalk near his house, or taking a late night evening walk,"19
clearly have no notion of city life in America, and presumably have
little concern for those living there for "[tihere is nothing positive
happening on the streets that time of night.
195
See Eldrin Bell - Chief of Police, T CITY OF ATLANTA JuvENmE CURFEv
ExPERIENCE, July 17, 1991; Dennis A. Garret - Chief of Police, JUVENEE CURMV
PiLOTPROGRAM (and related materials) Feb. 5, 1993.
"9 Waters v. Barry 711 F.Supp. 1125, 1135 (D.D.C. 1989). It was these listed
activities that the court felt obliged to protect and thus it invalidated a curfew.
" McCollester v. Keene, 586 F.Supp. 1381, 1385 (D.N.H. 1984).
195 Barbara O'Brien, Teens Say Cufew Would Victimize Blacks, BUFF. NEws, Feb.
15, 1991, at CS (quoting Archie Amos, Buffalo Common Council member).
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APPENDIX A
Re: Ordinance Amendment
New Chapter 343 - Promoting the General
Welfare of Minors in Public Places
The Common Council of the City of Buffalo does hereby
ordain as follows:
Section 1: That a new Chapter 343 entitled "Promoting the General
Welfare of Minors in Public Places," with Sections and Section
Headings to read as follows:
Chapter 343
Promoting the General Welfare of Minors in Public Places
See. 343.1
Sec. 343.2
Sec. 343.3
See. 343.4
See. 343.5
Sec. 343.6
Prohibited Acts
Parental Responsibility
Definitions
Ordinance Exceptions
Enforcement
Penalties
343.1 Prohibited Act
Subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 343.4 of
this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any minor sixteen (16) years of
age or younger to congregate, loiter, wander or play in or upon any
public place, between the hours of 11:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M. of the
following day, official city time, except on weekends, when such
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restricted hours shall be from 12:00 Midnight on Friday and Saturday
to 5:00 A.M. of the following day.
343.2 Parental Responsibility
Subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 343.4 of
this chapter, it shall be unlawful for the parent or guardian of any
minor sixteen (16) tears of age or younger to knowingly or
negligently by insufficient control allow such minor to congregate,
loiter, wander or play in or upon any public placebetween the hours
of 11:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M. of the following day, official city time,
except on weekends, when such restricted hours shall be from 12:00
Midnight on Friday and Saturday to 5:00 A.M. of the following day.
343.3 Definitions
a) Direct Route - The shortest path of travel through a public
place to reach a final destination, without any detour or stop.
b) Adult Supervised - Adult persons are present at the activity
and the adult persons take full responsibility for the minor.
c) Adult Sponsored - Adult persons underwrite or promote an
activity and the adult persons take responsibility for the minor.
d) Accompanied - To go along with or be associated with
under individualized supervision.
e) Parent - A natural parent, adoptive parent, stepparent or
another person, or other adult person having the lawful care and
custody of the minor.
f) Emergency Errand - An unforeseen combination of
circumstances or the resulting state that requires immediate action by
the minor to prevent serious bodily injury or loss of life.
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g) Public Place - Any place to which the public or a
substantial group of the public has access and includes, but is not
limited to, highways, streets, alleys, parks, playgrounds, shops,
shopping plazas, transportation facilities, vacant lots, hospitals and
public buildings.
h) Guardian - A person who, under court order, is the guardian
of the person of a minor; or a public or private agency with whom has
been placed by a Court.
i) Adult - Any person eighteen (18) years of age or older.
j) Sixteen Years of Age or Younger - Any person younger
than seventeen (17) years of age.
343.4 Exceptions
a) When the minor is on the sidewalk abutting the minor's
residency, and either next neighbor has not communicated an
objection to the police officer.
b) When the minor is travelling in a direct route to his or her
residency from employment and carries a signed statement from the
employer briefly identifying the minor, the address of the minor's
residency, the address of the minor's place of employment, the name
and title of the minor's employer who signed the statement, and
minor's hours of employment.
c) When the minor is travelling in a direct route to his or her
residency from an adult supervised or adult sponsored religious
school, civic, not-for-profit, recreational or entertainment activity or
adult supervised or sponsored organized dance.
d) When the minor is accompanied by his or her parent or
guardian.
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e) When the minor is accompanied by an adult authorized by
the parent or guardian of the minor.
f) When the minor is in a motor vehicle with parental or
guardian consent for normal travel, and interstate travel beginning or
ending in the City of Buffalo is expected.
g) When the minor is upon an emergency errand.
h) When the minor is attending or travelling in a direct route
to or from an activity involving the exercise of First Amendment
Rights protected by the United States Constitution.
343.5 Enforcement
Following strictly the applicable provisions of the
Family Court Act, Police officers and Buffalo Municipal Housing
Authority Officers are hereby authorized to take into custody any
minor who shall violate the provisions of this chapter.
343.6 Penalties
A parent or guardian who violates this Chapter shall:
upon the first violation, be issued a warning citation, upon the second
violation, be subject to a fine of not more than Twenty Five Dollars
($25.00); upon the third violation, be subject to a fine of not more
that One Hundred Dollars ($100.00); upon the fourth violation and
every offense thereafter be subject to a fine of not more than Two
Hundred Dollars ($200.00).
Section 2. Sunset Provision
This curfew ordinance shall expire twelve months after its
effective date unless enacted again by the Common Council.
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Section 3. Effective Date
This curfew ordinance shall take effect January 1, 1994.
It is hereby certified, pursuant to Section 34 of the Charter,
that immediate passage of the foregoing Ordinance is necessary.

